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Abstract
We analyze answers to household survey questions on whether the respondents’
household income has changed in the past twelve months, and on whether the re-
spondents expect their household income to change in the next twelve months. Both
questions are answered on a discrete ﬁve points scale. The data are an unbalanced
panel of eleven consecutive annual waves.
Using cross-tabulations of expected and realized changes, we ﬁr s tt e s tt h e" b e s t -
case" hypothesis. This hypothesis implies, under two diﬀerent nonparametric as-
sumptions on how respondents form their predictions, that respondents have ratio-
nal expectations, that there are no common unexpected shocks, and that reported
expectations are best predictions of future outcomes. We ﬁnd that the best case
hypothesis is rejected: for all years, too many respondents who predict an income
fall, ex post report that their household income has not changed.
We then construct a bivariate ordered probit random eﬀects panel data model,
in which we explain both expectations and realizations from background variables
such as age, education level, and labour market status, and from the one year
lagged expectation and realization. We show that the hypothesis of rational ex-
pectations implies certain restrictions on the parameters in the two equations of
this model. The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the
Geweke-Hajivassilou-Keane (GHK) method. The hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions is rejected. The hypotheses that expectations are adaptive or naive can be
tested in a similar way, and are also rejected.
1Statistics Netherlands is acknowledged for providing the data. We are grateful to Bas Donkers for
valuable comments. Please address correspondence to Marcel Das, Tilburg University, CentER Applied
Research, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands (e-mail: DAS@kub.nl)1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How economic agents form their expectations is an important issue in many ﬁelds of
economic theory. Common assumptions in the theoretical literature are rational expecta-
tions, adaptive expectations, or naive expectations. Empirical evidence on whether these
theories provide a realistic description of actual behaviour, is less common. The most
direct approach to this is to use survey information on what agents expect, and compare
that with ex post realizations. Several studies have analyzed the issue using micro data
from business surveys on whether output is expected to increase, decrease or remain the
same in the next three months. The answers are then compared with the answers to
a similar question asked three months later on what has actually happened to output.
Using a latent variable model, Ivaldi (1992) ﬁnds that the hypothesis of rational expec-
tations (REH) is not always rejected for the French manufacturing industry. Nerlove
and Schuermann (1995, 1997), on the other hand, using diﬀerent latent variable models,
unambiguously reject REH for Swiss and UK ﬁrms. They also reject the hypotheses of
adaptive expectations (AEH) and naive expectations (NEH).
Empirical work on expectations of private households or individuals, is even more
scarce. Still, expectations of future incomes, prices, and labour market opportunities, play
a major role in many life cycle models, in which households optimize some discounted value
of utility in the current and in future periods. Expectations are thus important in dynamic
structural models of savings, portfolio choice, consumption, investments in durable goods,
labour supply, job search, fertility, etc. In most such models, REH or another hypothesis
like AEH or NEH, are taken for granted. The ﬁt of the model or signiﬁcance of certain
behavioral parameters are sometimes used as indirect evidence in favour or against one
of these hypotheses, but this evidence is not very strong. If the wrong hypothesis is used,
this may hamper the usefulness of the structural models for policy analysis.
It is therefore important to investigate in a more direct way how private households
or individuals form their expectations. The way to do this is to use survey questions2
on the household’s future expectations on relevant economic phenomena, like prices and
household income. Various household surveys contain questions on the levels or changes
of these variables expected by the respondents, and respondents’ uncertainty in these
predictions. Some studies using Italian and Dutch surveys have investigated whether the
answers to such questions are related to the respondents’ actual economic behaviour in a
way that theory would predict. For example, Guiso, Japelli and Terlizzese (1996) show
that income uncertainty has a negative impact on the household portfolio share of risky
assets in Italy. Hochguertel (1998) ﬁnds a similar result for the Netherlands. On the other
hand, Alessie and Lusardi (1997) do not ﬁnd the expected negative relationship between
savings and the predicted income change in data for the Netherlands.
In this paper, we focus on household income expectations. We will not look at the
impact of expectations on economic behaviour like savings, portfolio choice, etc., but will
focus on a direct analysis of expectations formation, by comparing expected and realized
income changes. Our analysis is in line with the studies of Das, Dominitz and van Soest
(1999) and Das and van Soest (1997, 1999). We use panel data on Dutch households
covering the years 1984 until 1994. In each wave before 1994, heads of households have
answered questions on whether the respondents’ household income has changed in the
past twelve months, and on whether they expect their household income to change in the
next twelve months.1 Both questions are answered on a discrete ﬁve points scale.
First, we present the data, and apply the method of Das, Dominitz and van Soest
(1999). Using cross-tabulations of expected and realized changes, we nonparametrically
test the ”best-case” hypothesis, implying that respondents have rational expectations,
that there are no common unexpected shocks, and that reported expectations are best
predictions of future outcomes, under two diﬀerent nonparametric assumptions on how
respondents form their predictions. We ﬁnd that the best case hypothesis is rejected:
for all years, too many respondents who predict an income fall, report ex post that their
1Since 1994 respondents were only asked about their realized income change in the past twelve months.3
household income has not changed. This shows that people either do not have rational
expectations, or are faced with positive macroeconomic shocks for a number of consecutive
years. The latter explanation becomes less plausible the more panel waves are used.
The next step is to ﬁnd out for which groups of households REH cannot be conﬁrmed,
and to analyze how people form their expectations if they do not use rational expectations.
Das and van Soest (1997, 1999) have used univariate models for the deviations between
observed answers on expected and realized changes. Their approach, however, does not
account for the conceptual diﬀerence between expectations and realizations questions: the
former reﬂects some location measure (e.g. mean, mode, or median) of the respondent’s
subjective distribution of the income change, the latter is one draw from the actual income
change distribution. Even if actual and subjective distribution coincide, the discrete
nature of both variables implies that expectations and realizations are not necessarily the
same. This is shown by Manski (1990) and taken into account by the nonparametric tests.
The main contribution of the current paper is that we set up and estimate a structural
framework that takes the Manski (1990) critique into account. Observed categorical
realizations and expectations are modeled as two separate ordered response variables. We
introduce a bivariate ordered probit random eﬀects panel data model, in which we explain
both expectations and realizations from background variables such as age, education level,
and labour market status, and from the one year lagged expectation and realization.
Under the assumption that respondents’ expectations reﬂect the mean or median of their
subjective income change distribution, we derive restrictions on the parameters in the two
equations of this model which are valid under the null hypothesis of rational expectations.
These restrictions can be tested.
The model extends the models used by Nerlove and Schuermann (1995, 1997) in various
ways. It allows for background variables and lagged dependent variables. Moreover, the
model describes the complete eleven waves panel, while Nerlove and Schuermann look
at one pair of consecutive waves at the time. As a consequence, our model is not only4
useful to test whether REH is valid on average, for the population as a whole, but can
also be used to analyze how deviations between predictions and realizations vary with
household characteristics. Finally, while Nerlove and Schuermann cannot address the
issue of macroeconomic shocks and test REH under the assumption that macroeconomic
shocks do not play a role, we can distinguish macroeconomic shocks from violations of
REH under the maintained assumption that macroeconomic shocks are not correlated to
background characteristics.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the Geweke-Hajivassilou-
Keane (GHK) algorithm. The main conclusion is that the hypothesis of rational expec-
tations is rejected. In particular, high educated and disabled heads of household seem to
be too pessimistic, on average. The hypotheses that expectations are adaptive or naive
can be tested in a similar way, and are also rejected.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
describe the data. In Section 3, we discuss the nonparametric tests of Das, Dominitz
and van Soest (1999). In Section 4, we present the bivariate model for expectations and
realizations, and explain how REH, AEH and NEH can be tested in this framework. In
Section 5, we discuss the results. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
The data we use in the analysis are taken from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP),
which is administered by Statistics Netherlands. This panel runs since April 1984. Until
1989 households were interviewed twice a year: in April and in October. Since 1990,
information is gathered in May only.
We focus on subjective questions concerning household income growth. These ques-
tions are:5
1: Did your household’s income increase, decrease, or remain unchanged during the
past twelve months?
Possible answers: strong decrease (1); decrease (2); no change (3); increase (4);
strong increase (5).
2: What will happen to your household’s income in the next twelve months?
Possible answers: see 1.
To get the smoothest possible transition from the change in the timing of the interviews,
we use the April waves from 1984 till 1989, and the May waves from 1990 onwards (till
1994). A disadvantage of using the April waves is that we cannot use information on
actual income. Between 1984 and 1989, information on monthly income is collected in all
the October waves but not in all April waves. Moreover, in 1990 the questions concerning
income from several main sources such as earnings changed completely, so that comparable
data on actual income for the whole time period of eleven years are not available. We
will not use actual income variables, and will use variables like education level and age to
proxy the actual income level.
The SEP is an unbalanced panel. Each year households leave the panel, and new
households enter. The numbers of (heads of) households for all waves are presented in
Table 1. From the 1994 wave, we only use the answer to the question concerning the
past income change. We removed some households from the sample because of missing
answers to the subjective questions concerning income change, or because information on
household characteristics or characteristics of the head of household was missing. Table 1
displays the numbers of removed observations. The 1990 wave has substantial item non-
response on the subjective income change questions. An explanation is that the questions
in this wave are asked to either the head of household or the partner. In all other waves,
the answers were given by both the head of household and the partner. The rather high
number of observations which are removed because of missing characteristics in 1991, is
mainly due to lack of information on the education level.
In the model which will be introduced in Section 4, we will use the pooled data set
for all waves. This pooled data set is an unbalanced panel which originally contains 96916
observations. However, since we will only use observations that remain in the panel for
at least three consecutive years, the number of observations drops to 6408.2 Slightly less
than half of these are present in more than ﬁve waves; 603 households are observed in
all eleven waves. The ﬁnal row of Table 1 presents the actual number of observations
per wave that is used in the estimation of the model. Obviously, new households that
have entered the panel in the ﬁnal years are not included, since they are not observed for
at least three consecutive waves. This explains why the number of observations declines
t o w a r d st h ee n do ft h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
In the remainder of the paper, we will assume that sample selection, item nonresponse
on the income change variables, and attrition, are random conditional on the background
characteristics included in the regressions. The small nonresponse rates on the income
change variables (except for the 1990 wave, where nonresponse is due to the construction
of the questionnaire) gives some conﬁdence that this assumption is reasonable.
Table 1. Number of observations per wave.
wave
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
number of households:
3980 3458 4692 4611 5036 5119 5212 4821 5347 5184 5187
removed because of:
1) item nonresponse on subjective income change questions:
144 91 177 138 145 154 1875 35 61 41 235
2) missing characteristics:
35 35 97 100 306 73 9 591 37 31 -
used for estimation in pooled data set:
2369 2558 3753 3844 4051 4110 3008 3085 3529 3298 3045
2There were 1981 households with complete information for only one wave and 1302 households with
i n f o r m a t i o ni no n l yt w ow a v e s .7
3 Nonparametric tests
In this section we apply the method of Das, Dominitz and van Soest (1999) to compare
predictions and outcomes. Section 3.1 brieﬂy summarizes the framework and presents the
bounds on features of the empirical distribution of realized outcomes under the best case
scenario hypothesis, which implies REH. In Section 3.2 we present the results. While Das
et al. used the October waves of 1984 till 1989, we will use the April waves of 1984 till
1989 and the May waves of 1990 till 1994.
3.1 Method
Loosely stated, REH means that predictions and outcomes are based upon the same
distribution. Manski (1990) develops a framework in which REH can be tested, provided
several additional assumptions are made and maintained (including the assumption that
there are no macro-economic shocks). He refers to the complete set of assumptions as
the ”best case scenario.” He shows that the best case scenario leads to bounds on the
conditional outcome probabilities given the predictions. Das et al. (1999) extend Manski’s
framework to the ordered response case with more than two categories. It turns out that,
in the case with more than two categories, the bounds depend on the assumption on how
respondents form their ”best prediction.” Here, we discuss the bounds in case of the
modal and the median category assumption. Das et al. (1999) also discuss the ”category
containing the mean assumption,” but this can only be used if exact quantitative data
on realized income changes are available, which is not the case for the used waves of the
SEP in the current paper (see Section 2).
The ”best case scenario,” i.e., the null hypothesis which will be tested, involves more
than just REH. It is the joint hypothesis that: 1) respondents have rational expectations,
i.e. their subjective income change distribution coincides with the actual distribution
from which the realized income change is drawn; 2) diﬀerent households are independent
observations, implying that there are no macroeconomic shocks; 3) a given respondent8
uses the same income concept and the same category bounds for the answers on predicted
and realized income change (diﬀerent respondents may use diﬀerent concepts or bounds);
and 4) the respondents’ predicted income changes reﬂect the modal category or the me-
dian category of their subjective income distribution. Rejecting the null hypothesis can
therefore be interpreted as rejecting REH if the other three assumptions are maintained.
Modal category assumption
If each respondent’s prediction is the category with the highest probability, Das et al.
(1999) show that the best case scenario implies the following bounds on the conditional
probabilities of the (categorical) realization r given the (categorical) prediction p.
P{r = k|p = k} ≥ P{r = j|p = k},j =1 ,...,K, (1)
where K is the total number of (ordered) categories (K =5 , in our case). The inequality
can be tested for each j 6= k; it can be tested for the sample as a whole, or for speciﬁc
subgroups. We perform the test separately for each pair of consecutive waves.
The test based on the modal category assumption does not make use of the ordered
nature of the categorical data. The same inequalities have also been used for testing
REH on the basis of business surveys, without explicitly discussing the framework. Ivaldi
(1992) refers to it as a weak, nonparametric, test of REH.
Median category assumption
This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that respondents predict the category
containing the median of their subjective income distribution. It explicitly makes use of
the fact that the response categories are ordered. Das et al. (1999) derive the following
bounds on the conditional probabilities under the best case scenario.









The inequalities under both the modal and the median category assumption can be
tested using the asymptotic distribution of the sample fractions which are the sample
analogues of the population fractions in the inequalities. This distribution is only valid
if the observed realized income changes are independent, which explains why the null
hypothesis must include the assumption that there are no common shocks.
3.2 Results of the nonparametric tests
Table 2 presents the estimates of the conditional probabilities of the realizations given
the predictions for the sample as a whole. These estimates are used to test for signiﬁcant
violations of the modal category assumption, i.e. of one of the inequalities in (1). For
k =1(strong decrease predicted), the inequality (1) is not satisﬁed for 1986-1987, 1988-
1989, and 1989-1990. Only for 1986-1987, the violation is signiﬁcant. For k =2 ,t h et e s t
results are unanimous: for all pairs of waves, the estimate of P{r =3 |p =2 } signiﬁcantly
exceeds the estimate of P{r =2 |p =2 }, implying that the null hypothesis is rejected.
For k>2,n os i g n i ﬁcant violations of (1) are found. Thus the conclusion of Das et al.
(1999) is conﬁrmed for this longer time span: in all years, too many of those who expect
their incomes to fall, ex post report no change. The long time span for which this is
the case, makes it implausible that this is due to macroeconomic shocks; macroeconomic
shocks will sometimes be positive and sometimes be negative, and the probability that
ten consecutive shocks are positive is quite small. Thus the result suggests that at least
some respondents do not have rational expectations.10
Table 2. Estimates of P{r = j|p = k} (in percentages), where p
stands for predicted category and r for realized category of future
income change (n =# {i : pi = k}).
j =1 j =2 j =3 j =4 j =5 n
k =1 : ’84 - ’85 36.3 28.8 25.9 7.6 1.4 212
strong decrease ’85 - ’86 41.2 21.7 22.7 10.3 4.1 97
’86 - ’87 25.8 16.7 43.9 9.1 4.6 66
’87 - ’88 36.8 19.1 30.9 8.8 4.4 68
’88 - ’89 32.5 15.6 35.1 10.4 6.5 77
’89 - ’90 22.9 28.6 28.6 14.3 5.7 35
’90 - ’91 41.5 19.5 19.5 12.2 7.3 41
’91 - ’92 39.7 18.0 20.5 18.0 3.9 78
’92 - ’93 45.6 21.5 19.0 10.1 3.8 79
’93 - ’94 46.4 17.5 23.7 9.3 3.1 97
k =2 : ’84 - ’85 14.2 26.7 45.2 11.3 2.7 1237
decrease ’85 - ’86 6.9 19.9 55.1 16.0 2.1 682
’86 - ’87 10.0 20.1 54.7 13.2 2.1 583
’87 - ’88 12.0 22.8 52.1 10.7 2.4 457
’88 - ’89 11.2 20.8 50.1 14.3 3.6 475
’89 - ’90 11.7 20.0 33.2 27.9 7.2 265
’90 - ’91 16.8 23.3 36.2 16.4 7.3 232
’91 - ’92 17.2 22.3 41.1 15.5 3.9 489
’92 - ’93 12.8 23.9 42.2 17.3 3.9 510
’93 - ’94 14.9 27.6 40.2 14.7 2.6 619
k =3 : ’84 - ’85 4.9 14.5 58.0 19.0 3.6 1350
no change ’85 - ’86 2.8 8.7 60.4 24.3 3.8 1676
’86 - ’87 2.9 9.3 64.8 19.7 3.2 2747
’87 - ’88 2.3 8.3 67.0 19.2 3.2 3009
’88 - ’89 2.1 5.7 61.9 26.4 4.1 3065
’89 - ’90 2.6 6.6 45.7 37.8 7.2 2112
’90 - ’91 3.8 9.2 53.5 26.6 7.0 1915
’91 - ’92 4.6 9.9 53.3 27.7 4.6 2460
’92 - ’93 4.5 10.2 55.8 26.2 3.4 2730
’93 - ’94 3.8 11.7 59.5 22.3 2.7 2829
c o n t i n u e do nn e x tp a g e11
Table 2, continued
k =4 : ’84 - ’85 3.4 8.3 37.5 38.8 12.0 291
increase ’85 - ’86 4.0 3.7 30.5 49.2 12.6 374
’86 - ’87 1.9 4.8 34.6 43.1 15.7 703
’87 - ’88 1.8 4.6 35.3 44.6 13.7 762
’88 - ’89 2.3 4.0 24.3 52.9 16.6 832
’89 - ’90 2.0 4.1 14.8 55.7 23.4 560
’90 - ’91 3.4 4.4 23.6 46.3 22.3 681
’91 - ’92 3.9 8.3 24.3 46.3 17.1 1196
’92 - ’93 2.6 6.9 27.3 50.6 12.6 1250
’93 - ’94 3.5 8.1 29.0 49.2 10.3 984
k =5 : ’84 - ’85 0.0 9.1 45.5 36.4 9.1 11
strong increase ’85 - ’86 6.7 13.3 20.0 13.3 46.7 15
’86 - ’87 10.3 0.0 13.8 44.8 31.0 29
’87 - ’88 2.2 6.7 22.2 31.1 37.8 45
’88 - ’89 2.6 2.6 13.2 21.1 60.5 38
’89 - ’90 0.0 0.0 15.4 26.9 57.7 26
’90 - ’91 0.0 5.9 17.7 26.5 50.0 34
’91 - ’92 6.1 3.7 19.5 35.4 35.4 82
’92 - ’93 5.9 3.4 12.5 27.3 51.1 88
’93 - ’94 10.5 14.9 11.9 25.4 37.3 67
Table 3 shows 90% conﬁdence intervals for the cumulative probabilities that can be used
to test the best case scenario under the median category assumption. For k =1 ,i n e q u a l -
ity (2) is signiﬁcantly violated in 7 combinations of years. For k =2 , inequality (2) is
violated in all combinations of years. For k =3and k =4 , no violations of either (2) or
(3) are found. For k =5 ,w eﬁnd that (3) is rejected in 5 out of 10 combinations of years,
suggesting that too many of those who predict a large income increase, report a smaller
increase or no increase at all. Together with the result for k =1 , this suggests that too
many people give predictions in the extreme categories. That we ﬁnd this with the median
category assumption only is explained by the fact that the modal category assumption
always requires a plurality of probability mass in the predicted category, whereas the me-
dian category requires a majority when either the lowest or highest category is predicted.
For k =2 , however, the results of median and modal category are completely in line with
each other: the best case scenario is rejected for all combinations of years.12
Table 3. 90% conﬁdence intervals for the (cumulative)
probabilities where p stands for predicted category and r for
realized category of future income change (in percentages;
n =# {i : pi = k})
P{r<k |p = k} P{r>k |p = k} n
lower upper lower upper
k =1 : ’84 - ’85 —— 58.2 69.1 212
strong decrease ’85 - ’86 —— 50.5 67.0 97
’86 - ’87 —— 65.4 83.1 66
’87 - ’88 —— 56.3 72.9 68
’88 - ’89 —— 58.8 76.3 77
’89 - ’90 —— 65.5 88.8 35
’90 - ’91 —— 45.9 71.2 41
’91 - ’92 —— 51.1 69.4 78
’92 - ’93 —— 45.2 63.6 79
’93 - ’94 —— 45.3 61.9 97
k =2 : ’84 - ’85 12.5 15.8 56.9 61.5 1237
decrease ’85 - ’86 5.3 8.5 70.4 76.0 682
’86 - ’87 7.9 12.0 66.9 73.1 583
’87 - ’88 9.5 14.5 61.5 68.9 457
’88 - ’89 8.8 13.5 64.5 71.5 475
’89 - ’90 8.5 14.9 63.6 73.0 265
’90 - ’91 12.8 20.8 54.6 65.2 232
’91 - ’92 14.4 20.0 56.9 64.2 489
’92 - ’93 10.3 15.2 59.8 66.8 510
’93 - ’94 12.5 17.2 54.2 60.8 619
k =3 : ’84 - ’85 17.6 21.2 20.7 24.5 1350
no change ’85 - ’86 10.2 12.7 26.4 30.0 1676
’86 - ’87 11.2 13.3 21.7 24.3 2747
’87 - ’88 9.6 11.5 21.2 23.7 3009
’88 - ’89 6.9 8.5 29.0 31.8 3065
’89 - ’90 8.2 10.3 43.3 46.9 2112
’90 - ’91 11.7 14.2 31.8 35.4 1915
’91 - ’92 13.3 15.6 30.7 33.8 2460
’92 - ’93 13.5 15.8 28.2 31.0 2730
’93 - ’94 14.3 16.6 23.7 26.4 2829
c o n t i n u e do nn e x tp a g e13
Table 3, continued
k =4 : ’84 - ’85 44.3 54.0 8.9 15.2 291
increase ’85 - ’86 34.1 42.4 9.7 15.4 374
’86 - ’87 38.2 44.3 13.4 17.9 703
’87 - ’88 38.8 44.7 11.6 15.7 762
’88 - ’89 27.9 33.2 14.5 18.7 832
’89 - ’90 18.1 23.7 20.5 26.3 560
’90 - ’91 28.5 34.4 19.7 24.9 681
’91 - ’92 34.2 38.8 15.3 18.9 1196
’92 - ’93 34.5 39.0 11.1 14.2 1250
’93 - ’94 38.0 43.1 8.7 11.9 984
k =5 : ’84 - ’85 76.7 100.0 ——11
strong increase ’85 - ’86 32.1 74.5 ——15
’86 - ’87 54.8 83.1 ——29
’87 - ’88 50.3 74.1 ——45
’88 - ’89 26.4 52.5 ——38
’89 - ’90 26.4 58.2 ——26
’90 - ’91 35.9 64.1 ——34
’91 - ’92 55.9 73.3 ——82
’92 - ’93 40.1 57.6 ——88
’93 - ’94 53.0 72.4 ——67
4M o d e l
The results in the previous section imply that the joint hypothesis of no macro-economic
shocks, rational expectations, and questions on expected and realized income changes are
answered in the same way, is rejected for all time periods we consider. In this section we
will impose more structure and formulate an econometric model to investigate why this
joint hypothesis is rejected. Can we reject rational expectations, and, if so, can we indicate
which groups of people typically have non-rational expectations, or can we explain the
results from macroeconomic shocks and do we not need to reject REH? We introduce a
bivariate model explaining the answers to the predicted as well as the realized income
change questions, which generalizes the models used by Nerlove and Schuermann (1995,
1997).14
Realized income changes
We allow for an unbalanced panel, but will only use respondents i who participate in at
least three consecutive waves. Ni is deﬁned as the number of consecutive waves in which
respondent i is observed and index t corresponds to the diﬀerent waves (ranging from −1
to Ni−2,w h e r et h ew a v ew i t hi n d e x−1 is used for the explanatory variables in the initial
condition equation; see below.).
The answer to the realized income change question given in wave t of the survey
by respondent i is denoted by yit. This is an ordered variable, with ﬁve possible answers
coded from 1 (strong decrease) to 5 (strong increase). Like in a standard ordered response
model, we assume that it relates to an underlying continuous latent variable y∗
it as follows:






j (j =1 ,...,5).








5 = ∞ are assumed to be








4 are parameters to be
estimated. 3








i,t−1 + λt + αiy + ²it, (4)
where Xi,t−1 is a vector of background variables reﬂecting, for example, age, education
level, and labour market status of the respondent. Note that y∗
it refers to income in the
period between times t − 1 and t, and Xi,t−1 refers to the beginning of this period. This
explains why Xi,t−1 is included rather than Xit. An additional reason for this is that it will
make comparing the equations for predictions and realizations easier, as will be explained
below. Note that we have included the latent lagged variable y∗
i,t−1 and not the latent
observed variable yi,t−1.T h i s r e ﬂects the notion that the observed variable is discrete
due to the way it is measured only, while the underlying continuous latent variable is the
3Some of them will be normalized; see below.15
magnitude of economic relevance. The parameter αiy is an individual speciﬁc( r a n d o m )
eﬀect, included to allow for unobserved heterogeneity across respondents; ²it is an error
term. Assumptions on the distributions of αiy and ²it will be given below. Time dummies
λt are included to allow for macro-economic shocks. These macro-economic shocks are
thus assumed to be common for all respondents, and do not vary with Xi,t−1 or y∗
i,t−1.
Since the equation contains the lagged income change, it cannot be used for t =0 .
Due to the latent variable nature of the model, simply ignoring t =0leads to inconsistent
estimates (see Heckman, 1981a). Following Heckman (1981b), we solve this problem by







where the individual eﬀect is included in the error term ²i0. The presence of Xi,−1 in the
above equation explains why we can only use observations who are present in at least
three consecutive waves. Only from the third wave onwards (t =1 ), the observations
provide useful information for estimating the parameters in the dynamic equation. 4
Predictions of income changes
The answer to the expected income change question given in wave t of the survey by
respondent i is denoted by pit. This is an ordered response variable. Analogously to yit,
we model it using an underlying continuous latent variable p∗
it:






j (j =1 ,...,5).
We make the same assumptions on the category boundaries m
p
j as on m
y





j are identical, but, apart from some necessary normalization to identify
the model (see below), this is something we can test, and we will not impose it ap r i o r i .
We specify the following latent variable equation for p∗
it:
4Some (but probably very little) eﬃciency could be gained by using the observations which are in the
panel for two waves, since these do provide information for estimating the auxiliary parameters in the
reduced form equation. Moreover, an alternative which avoids the loss of the ﬁrst observation (t = −1)
would be to include Xi,0 instead of Xi,−1 in the equation for t =0 . This would drive a larger wedge









i,t−1 + νt + αip + ωit. (5)
The parameter αip is an individual speciﬁc( r a n d o m )e ﬀect, included to allow for unob-
served heterogeneity across respondents. This will probably be correlated with αiy. ωit
is an error term. Time dummies νt in this equation are included to allow for anticipated
macroeconomic eﬀects.
T h ei n c o m ec h a n g ep r e d i c t i o np∗
it given in wave t refers to the income change in the
next twelve months. It is allowed to depend on the realized income change y∗
it which the
respondent has experienced during the past twelve months. p∗
it is a prediction of y∗
i,t+1,s o
the eﬀect of yit on pit may reﬂect a genuine economic process which leads to correlation
between y∗
it and y∗
i,t+1. It may also, however, reﬂect a psychological eﬀect of past income
changes on future expectations. The two can be disentangled using (4), the equation for
y∗
it. The parameter ρ in (4) is the genuine eﬀect, a deviation between ρ and θ1 would
indicate a psychological eﬀect. This eﬀect will not be there if REH is satisﬁed. This
example therefore already illustrates how the two equations (4) and (5) can and will be
used to test for (parameter restrictions implied by) rational expectations.
Finally, we also allow the prediction in year t to depend on the prediction in year
t − 1. Such a relation might be interpreted in an adaptive expectations framework, as
we will show below. Earlier work on a univariate model suggested that such an eﬀect is
signiﬁcant though quantitatively not very important (see Das and van Soest, 1999).
For the same reason as in the case of the realized income change, a separate linearized









We assume that the error terms {(²it,ωit),t=0 ,...,Ni − 2} are normally distributed and
independent of the regressors {Xit,t= −1,...,Ni−2} and of the individual eﬀects αiy and17
αip. We allow for arbitrary correlations between ²it, ωit, ²i,t−1,a n dωi,t−1, but we assume
independence between error terms in waves t and s if |t − s| > 1.
The individual eﬀects (αiy,αip) are treated as random eﬀects, assumed to be indepen-
dent of Xit.F i x e d e ﬀects models are not considered. First, many of the regressors of
interest such as age and education level variables do not vary over time or vary over time
in a systematic way, and their eﬀects would not be identiﬁed in a ﬁxed eﬀects context.
Second, due to the discrete bivariate nature of the model, estimation techniques allowing
for ﬁxed eﬀects are, to our knowledge, not available. Third and most importantly, sys-
tematic time persistent violations of REH would be captured in the ﬁxed eﬀects. If, for
example, for some group of respondents the individual eﬀects in the realizations equation
would be much larger than those in the predictions equation, this would imply that this
group systematically underestimates their income changes and does not have rational ex-
pectations. Treating the individual eﬀects as ﬁxed and eliminating them from the model,
would hide this type of REH violations and would reduce the power of the test for REH in
the direction of time persistent non-rational behaviour. Using random eﬀects, assuming
individual eﬀects are independent of background variables, avoids this problem.
We allow for correlation between αiy and αip.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, we assume that
(αiy,αip) is bivariate normal with mean zero, variances σ2
αy and σ2
αp,a n dc o v a r i a n c eσαy,αp.
Rational expectations
In the model introduced above, the relation between predictions and realizations is very
ﬂexible. We will now show that rational expectations implies testable restrictions on the
parameters in the two dynamic equations.
We assume that the predictions p∗
it reﬂect some location measure of the individual’s
subjective distribution of the underlying continuous income change variable y∗
it, condi-
tional on the individual’s information set at time t−1. Since our (normality) assumptions
imply that the conditional distribution of y∗
it is symmetric, the conditional mean and the18
conditional median of y∗
it are the same, so it does not make any diﬀerence which of the
two location measures we use. The assumption that p∗
it reﬂects the median of the condi-
tional distribution of y∗
it is in line with the median category assumption in the previous
section, since the median category is the same as the category containing the median
of the underlying continuous latent variable. It is not in line with the modal category
assumption, since the modal category is not necessarily the category containing the mode
of the continuous variable.
Rational expectations implies that the realized income change y∗
i,t+1 is drawn from this
same distribution. If the respondent’s information set at the time of the interview in wave







Since the respondent’s information set will contain the lagged variables and the exogenous











i,t + αiy + E{λt+1 + ²i,t+1|Iit}.
A necessary condition for this to hold for all respondents in all time periods is
γ1 = β1; θ1 = ρ; θ2 =0 . (6)
I fw ew o u l dh a v eu s e dt h em e d i a ni n s t e a do ft h em e a n ,t h er e s u l tw o u l dh a v eb e e nt h e
same, the only diﬀerence being that Et{λt+1+²i,t+1|Iit} would be replaced by Mediant{λt+1+
²i,t+1|Iit}.
Rational expectations thus implies the equality restrictions on the parameters in the
two dynamic equations given in (6). We will estimate the model with and without im-
posing these restrictions. A likelihood ratio test will then show whether the hypothesis of
rational expectations can be rejected or not.5
5In principle, a similar set of restrictions could be tested for the static equations for t =0 . Since these
are considered as auxiliary equations, however, we chose not to consider such restrictions.19
The restrictions to be tested do not involve the time dummies νt and λt+1.T h er e a -
son is that REH implies νt = E{λt+1|Iit} or νt = Median{λt+1|Iit}, but not νt = λt+1.
Without imposing REH or other additional assumptions, we cannot consistently estimate
E{λt+1|Iit} or Median{λt+1|Iit}; we can only estimate λt+1 itself. On the other hand,
if we do impose REH, we can interpret the estimates of νt in the restricted model (im-
posing (6)) as estimates of E{λt+1|Iit} or Median{λt+1|Iit}. The diﬀerences between
the estimates of the realized macroeconomic eﬀects λt+1 and the estimates of the antic-
ipated macroeconomic eﬀects νt can then be interpreted as estimates of the realizations
of unanticipated macroeconomic eﬀects, i.e., as macroeconomic shocks.
The test for REH thus allows for unanticipated macroeconomic eﬀects, and is in this
sense more general than the tests used by Nerlove and Schuermann (1995, 1997). On the
other hand, the restrictions in (6) clearly rely on the assumption that macro-economic
eﬀects are uncorrelated with the right hand side variables Xi,t, y∗
i,t and p∗
i,t−1. This main-
tained assumption can be relaxed by testing fewer restrictions. For example, a test on
θ1 = ρ and θ2 =0can be seen as a test of REH allowing for macro-economic shocks which
c a nb ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hXi,t−1 but conditional on Xi,t−1 not with y∗
i,t−1 or p∗
i,t−1. Perhaps
the weakest test is a simple test on whether θ2 is nonzero, since there does not seem any
reason why macro-economic shocks should be correlated to past predictions, conditional
on everything else. As we will see later, a signiﬁcant value of θ2 can (partly) be motivated
from the assumption of adaptive expectations.
Normalization
The issue of normalization slightly complicates comparing the restricted model (imposing
(6)) and the unrestricted model. In the unrestricted model, we need separate scale and
location normalizations for the latent variables reﬂecting expected and realized incomes.









In the restricted model, the equality of slope coeﬃcients in the two dynamic equations20
implies that the scale normalization needs to be imposed in one of the two equations only;
the scale of the other equation is then identiﬁed due to the restrictions. (The location
normalization remains the same as in the unrestricted model, since we do not restrict the
time dummies.) Thus in the restricted model, we impose m
y





but we estimate m
p
3. This implies that the number of degrees of freedom for the likelihood
ratio test is reduced by 1.6
Adaptive and Naive Expectations
Although this is probably less relevant than REH, the framework can also be used to test
the hypotheses of adaptive expectations (AEH) and naive expectations (NEH). These
cases are nested in the general two equations model. AEH implies (see Nerlove and










for some parameter δ > 0,w h e r eut is an anticipated macroeconomic eﬀect. This implies
the following restrictions on the parameters of the two dynamic equations:
γ1 =0 ; θ1 + θ2 =1 . (7)
Naive expectations would imply that the (latent) prediction is given by the current






This is the special case of AEH with δ =1 , and thus implies the following restrictions on
the parameters of the general model:
γ1 =0 ; θ1 =1 ; θ2 =0 . (8)
6U s i n gad i ﬀerent normalization would avoid this problem, but would not make the estimation results
more transparent.21
Like REH, both AEH and NEH can be tested using likelihood ratio tests or Wald tests
on parameter restrictions in the general two equations model.
It could also be the case that expectations are driven by a mixture of AEH and REH.
In our framework, it is possible to test the hypothesis that expectations are a convex





i,t+1|Iit} +( 1− α){δy
∗
it +( 1− δ)p
∗
i,t−1 + ut}
for some α ∈ [0,1]. Eliminating α en δ, it is straightforward to show that this implies the
following non-linear set of parameter restrictions.
(1 − ρ)γ1 =( 1 − θ1 − θ2)β1. (9)
These restrictions can again be tested using a likelihood ratio test. (The normalization
issue is similar to that in the REH test, and can be accounted for in the same way.)
Estimation
The complete bivariate model for all waves is a recursive system of ordered response equa-
tions. Due to the normality assumptions on the error terms and the random individual
eﬀects, the likelihood contribution of one respondent can be written as a multivariate nor-
mal probability, with covariance matrix depending on the parameters. Exact computation
of the likelihood would require high dimensional numerical integration and is therefore
infeasible in practice. This is a typical case for smooth simulated maximum likelihood,
where the exact likelihood contributions are replaced by approximations based upon a
number (R, say) of independent random draws for each individual. See Hajivassiliou and
Ruud (1994), for example. If R tends to inﬁnity, the approximating likelihood tends to
the exact likelihood, and the estimates based upon maximizing the approximate likeli-
hood will be similar to the maximum likelihood estimates. Under appropriate regularity
conditions, if draws are independent across individuals, and if R tends to inﬁnity faster
than
√
n, the simulated maximum likelihood estimator and the exact maximum likelihood22
estimator are asymptotically equivalent, and standard errors etc. can be computed in the
same way as for the exact ML—estimator.
The remaining issue is how to do the draws and how to use them to approximate
the likelihood. The crude frequency simulator — based upon full draws of all the errors,
yielding a zero or a one for each replication — is intuitively attractive, but leads to an
approximation of the likelihood which is non-diﬀerentiable with respect to the parame-
ters of the model, making it hard to ﬁnd the maximum. A much better alternative here
is the GHK (Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Keane) simulator, which is speciﬁcally designed
for multivariate normal probabilities, and which has been applied successfully to similar
models. See Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) or Keane (1993) for a description and further
references. The idea is that the multivariate probability in the likelihood is written recur-
sively as a product of univariate conditional normal probabilities, where the conditions
are inequalities. Independent draws from the uniform distribution on [0,1] are then recur-
sively transformed into draws from a truncated normal, where truncation is based upon
the same inequality conditions. The conditional probabilities given the inequalities are
then replaced by the conditional probabilities given the previous draws. The latter are
univariate normal probabilities and therefore easy to work with. The likelihood contribu-
tion is approximated by an average over R approximations based upon R such sequences
of draws. The approximate likelihood is a diﬀerentiable function of the parameters, and
the regularity conditions needed for asymptotic equivalence of exact ML and simulated
ML will be satisﬁed (provided that R tends to inﬁnity faster than
√
n).
The results we present are based upon R =2 5 . We also estimated the model with
R =1 0 , which gave similar results. This suggests that 25 replications is enough in our
application.23
5R e s u l t s
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the parameters in the dynamic equations (4)
and (5) in the unrestricted model. 7 The ﬁrst part of the table refers to the realization y∗
and the second part corresponds to the prediction p∗. All but one of the slope coeﬃcients
in the equation for y∗ (β1) and all but three of the slope coeﬃcients in the equation for p∗
(γ1)a r es i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level. The signs of the coeﬃcients in γ1 and β1 are always
the same.
A female head of household (gender=2), on average, predicts and experiences a lower
income change than a male head of household (gender=1), ceteris paribus. Realized and
predicted income changes are, on average, lower when the head of household is older.
The results for the dummies for education level are as expected. On average, those with
higher equation level predict and experience higher changes in income. 8 This is in line
with the stylized fact that life cycle income patterns are steeper for the higher educated.
The eﬀect of education level on the predictions seems smaller than the eﬀect on the
realizations. The dummies referring to the labor market status indicate that unemployed
and disabled heads of households experience and predict lower income growth than others
(working heads). Similarly, income changes for two earner households are lower than for
one earner households.
Considering the parameters that reﬂect the dynamics of the model we see that past
actual income growth positively relates to current actual income growth. Still, since ρ is
only 0.43 and thus far less than one, the eﬀect of changes in income in the past on current
income growth vanishes quite rapidly. The estimates of θ1 and θ2 indicate that current
realized income growth and past predictions have a positive impact on predicted income
growth in the next twelve months. The eﬀect of past predictions (θ2) is signiﬁcant at the
7See Table A1 in the appendix for the deﬁnitions of the exogenous variables. Estimation results for
the parameters in the auxiliary initial condition equations are presented in Table A2 in the appendix.
8For the predicted income change the coeﬃcient for education level 4 is slightly higher than for
education level 5, but this diﬀerence is far from signiﬁcant.24
10% level but not at the 5% level. The eﬀect of the past realization is stronger, though
not as strong as in the equation for the realization.
Table 4. Estimates of the parameters in the unrestricted model
Realization(y) Prediction (p)
variable estimate t-value variable estimate t-value
gender -0.16 -7.14 gender -0.11 -4.66
age/10 -0.24 -6.53 age/10 -0.30 -7.75
(age/10)2 0.015 3.85 (age/10)2 0.021 5.41
d_edu2 0.017 0.62 d_edu2 0.020 0.74
d_edu3 0.069 2.74 d_edu3 0.060 2.41
d_edu4 0.21 6.70 d_edu4 0.085 2.50
d_edu5 0.26 6.69 d_edu5 0.081 1.89
d_unem -0.14 -3.05 d_unem -0.19 -5.00
d_ret -0.093 -2.48 d_ret -0.034 -1.02
d_dis -0.097 -2.69 d_dis -0.22 -6.48
d_two -0.091 -4.89 d_two -0.060 -3.41
ρ 0.43 16.38 θ1 0.31 3.33
θ2 0.15 1.77
λ1986 1.25 12.48 ν1986 0.98 7.90
λ1987 1.13 10.98 ν1987 1.02 8.34
λ1988 1.09 10.66 ν1988 1.06 8.85
λ1989 1.36 13.09 ν1989 1.05 7.97
λ1990 1.62 15.30 ν1990 1.01 6.82
λ1991 1.17 10.85 ν1991 1.13 8.52
λ1992 1.16 11.03 ν1992 1.12 8.82



















4 2.62 141.30 m
p
4 2.58 107.85
σ² 1.32 100.89 σω 0.91 30.03







log likelihood: -59404 (number of observations = 6408)25
The estimated covariance structure of the random eﬀects and the error terms is largely
in line with what we would expect. The variance of the prediction errors (σ2
ω) is smaller
than the variance of the error terms in the realizations (σ2
²), in line with the fact that the
prediction is a location measure of the (subjective) income distribution, while the real-
i z a t i o ni so n ed r a wo ft h e( a c t u a l )i n c o m ec h a n g ed i s t r i b u t i o n .T h en e g a t i v ec o r r e l a t i o n
between ²i,t−1 and ²i,t can be due to the transitory component of the income level, which
induce a negative correlation between income changes. The negative correlation between
²i,t (referring to the income change between t−1 and t)a n dωi,t (referring to the predicted
change between t and t +1 ) then shows that respondent are aware of this.
The estimated variance of the individual eﬀect in the predictions is larger than that
in the realizations, indicating larger unobserved heterogeneity in the subjective than in
the objective variable. The two individual eﬀects have a signiﬁcant positive correlation
of about 0.14, which is insigniﬁcant and surprisingly small: we would expect that most of
the individual eﬀect in the realization were in the respondent’s information set, so that it
could be used to predict the future income change.
Testing the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
Rational expectations implies the parameter restrictions in the dynamic equations given
in (6). We re-estimated the model under these restrictions and used a likelihood ratio
test to test them. Estimation results for the restricted model are presented in Table A3 in
the appendix. The realization of the likelihood ratio test statistic is equal to 49.8, by far
exceeding the critical value of χ2
12;0.05 =2 1 .0. We therefore conclude that REH is rejected.
Comparing the parameters in the equations for realized and predicted income growth
gives us an indication of why REH is rejected. Table 5 gives the estimates and t-values
of the diﬀerences between β1 and γ1, ρ and θ1, and θ2 and 0 in the unrestricted model,
and thus gives insight in the separate REH restrictions in (6). We see that all diﬀerences
are insigniﬁcant at the two-sided 5% level except those related to education level and26
the dummy for disability of the head of household. For example, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that past income growth inﬂuences realized and predicted income growth in
the next twelve months in the same way: the diﬀerence between the estimates of the
coeﬃcients of the lagged income change (ρ and θ1)i sn o ts i g n i ﬁcant.
Table 5. Estimates of the diﬀerences
between β1 and γ1 and ρ and θ1.












ρ − θ1 0.12 1.22
0 − θ2 -0.15 1.77
The higher educated have, on average, a larger tendency to underpredict and a smaller
tendency to overpredict their future income change than the lower educated. Since we
allow for macro-economic shocks — which are assumed to be independent of education
level — we cannot unambiguously conclude whether the high educated have rational ex-
pectations and the lower educated tend to overpredict, or whether the low educated have
rational expectations while the high educated tend to underpredict. The tables in Section
3, however, suggest that the latter is more likely than the former.
A similar conclusion holds for heads of households who receive a disability beneﬁt.
Compared to employed heads of household, they have a larger tendency to underpredict
their future income change. The reason may be the ongoing public debate on reorganizing
the disability beneﬁt system in the Netherlands, which has led to considerable concern27
among the recipients. While the system has been adjusted, the income reductions of the
disabled have not been as large as may have been expected. Moreover, the number of
people on disability beneﬁts has not fallen as much as the government had hoped, and
this has resulted in new plans for further reorganizations.
In spite of the fact that the restricted model is rejected, the estimates in Table A3
which impose the REH restrictions contain some interesting results. First, the parameter
m
p
3 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. Thus there is no evidence that respondents use
diﬀerent thresholds for predictions and outcomes when they distinguish between no change
and an income fall or an income rise. But of course it has to be admitted that this can
only be investigated to a limited extent, due to the normalizations we have had to impose.
Second, the predicted macroeconomic eﬀects νt are all smaller than the realized eﬀects
λt+1 for the same time period. This result remains the same if we impose m
p
3 =1 ,and is
therefore not due to the chosen normalization. If people had rational expectations and
use the same category bounds for predictions and realizations, this would imply that all
macroeconomic shocks are positive. This result therefore corresponds to the result found
using the nonparametric tests.
Testing Adaptive and Naive Expectations
Table 4 immediately shows that many parameters in γ1 are signiﬁcant, and that the sum
of θ1 and θ2 is much smaller than 1. Thus many of the restrictions on the parameters
under adaptive expectations (given by (7)) are separately rejected, and a formal test on
joint signiﬁcance conﬁrms that AEH is rejected. Since naive expectations are a special
case of adaptive expectations, it should not come as a surprise that the hypothesis of naive
expectations (NEH, restrictions (8)) is also rejected. Thus respondents’ income change
expectations are neither rational, nor adaptive or naive.28
Some Probabilities of Predictions and Realizations
To obtain more insight in the results obtained with the general (unrestricted) model, we
have computed some probabilities of predicted and realized income changes for some ref-
erence respondents. To do this, we have to give a stronger interpretation of the latent
variables underlying the predictions and realizations. We assume that they can be in-
terpreted as the underlying change on a continuous scale. Thus a positive value means
a positive change and a negative value means a negative change, an assumption which
seems reasonable given that in the general model, the bounds for the no change category





t as the probabilities that the realized income change is smaller or larger than
the predicted change. This seems a plausible assumption given that the normalizations
on the bounds are identical in both equations.
We consider male heads of household of two diﬀerent education levels, the lowest and
the highest level. Both have average age (46.3 years), are employees, are the only earner
in their families, and have zero predicted and experienced income change in the previous
period (y∗
t =0and p∗
t−1 =0 ). Individual eﬀects are also set to zero. Without impos-
ing REH, we cannot disentangle macro-economic shocks from prediction errors, and we
therefore compare predictions and realizations including the macro-economic shocks, i.e.
we incorporate the estimated time dummies in both equations in the computations. We
consider two pairs of years: 1993-1994, for which Table A3 suggests that the macroeco-
nomic shock is relatively small (cf. the time dummies in Table A3), and 1989-1990 for
which the macroeconomic shock is much larger.
The ﬁrst two rows in Table 6 compare the probability that the underlying latent
variables are negative, i.e. that an income fall would be predicted or experienced on a
continuous scale. As expected from the estimates in Table 4, both the probability that
an income fall is predicted and the probability that an income fall is realized fall with
education level. The diﬀerence is stronger for the realization than for the prediction. For29
1993-1994, the probabilities of predicting and experiencing an income fall are not very
diﬀerent for the low educated, but for the high educated, an income fall is less common
than the predictions would suggest. For 1989-1990, the actual income change tends to
be better than the prediction for the lower educated, and the diﬀerence for the higher
educated is even larger. This illustrates the result in Table 5 that the higher educated
have a larger tendency to underpredict than the lower educated. It also conﬁrms that
in 1989-1990, the unanticipated macro-economic income shock was much larger than in
1993-1994.
The third row gives the probability that the realized continuously measured change
exceeds the predicted continuously measured change. Under REH and without macro-
economic shocks, this probability should be 0.5. It is always larger than that. Again, the
high probabilities for the reference respondent with university level illustrate their relative
pessimism, and the high probabilities for 1989-1990 suggest a positive macro-economic
shock in that time period.
The fourth and ﬁfth row of the table refer to the probabilities that the respondents
report that they expect their income to fall (or to fall strongly), and report that their
income has fallen (or has fallen strongly). These diﬀer from the ﬁrst two rows, since many
respondents who predict or experience a only small negative change on the continuous
scale, will report no change on the discrete scale. In other words, an income fall is reported
only if prediction or realization are lower than some negative threshold, normalized to −1.
Since the realizations have larger standard deviation than the predictions, this threshold
is more important for the predictions than for the realizations. This explains why in
1993-1994, the probability that a realized income fall is reported, exceeds the probability
that an income fall is predicted. The relative diﬀerences between years and education
levels, remain the same as in the top rows.
Rows six and seven of Table 6 present the probabilities that a predicted and realized
income rise are reported. The result is in line with what we already saw. For both30
years and both education levels, we ﬁnd much larger probabilities that respondents ex
post report an income rise than that respondents report ex ante that they expect their
income to rise. This is partly due to the larger dispersion in the realizations, and partly
to underpredicting. Diﬀerences between education levels and years lead to the same
conclusions as in the remainder of the table.
Table 6. Probabilities based upon the estimates in Table 4. Boot-
strapped standard errors are in parentheses.
low educated high educated
probability t=1989 t=1993 t=1989 t=1993
P(p∗
t < 0) 0.50 (0.023) 0.55 (0.016) 0.46 (0.033) 0.51 (0.026)
P(y∗
t+1 < 0) 0.30 (0.011) 0.49 (0.011) 0.24 (0.012) 0.41 (0.014)
P(p∗
t <y ∗
















3) 0.40 (0.011) 0.23 (0.008) 0.48 (0.015) 0.30 (0.011)
6 Conclusions
Using panel data on expectations and realizations of income changes, we have investigated
whether heads of household have rational expectations. First, we have used the nonpara-
metric framework of Manski (1990) to test the best case scenario of rational expectations
and absence of macro-economic shocks, combined with two diﬀerent assumptions on which31
location measure of their income change distribution respondents use to form their pre-
dictions. Both lead to the conclusion that the best case scenario is rejected for each of
the ten combinations of years we consider, since too many people who expect an income
fall experience no change.
Next, we have formulated a bivariate dynamic latent variable model for predictions
and realizations of income changes. The model is consistent with the Manski (1990)
framework combined with the notion that people’s predictions reﬂect the mean or median
of their subjective income change distribution, and extends models used by Nerlove and
Schuermann (1995, 1997) for testing REH and AEH of businesses. Unlike the earlier mod-
els, our model can distinguish between macro-economic shocks and violations of rational
expectations. Our main conclusion here is that REH is rejected under various assump-
tions on the macro-economic shocks, even if these macro-economic shocks are allowed to
be correlated to household characteristics and income changes in the past.
Our results are based upon eleven years of data for one country only. Obviously,
whether the results we ﬁnd are speciﬁct ot h ec o u n t r ya n dt h et i m ep e r i o dw ec o n s i d e r
remains to be seen. Still, our results suggest that alternative theories of expectations
formation are needed to explain our data. This remains the challenge for future research.32
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Appendix
Table A1. Deﬁnitions of exogenous variables
gender gender head of household: 1 =m a l e ;2 =f e m a l e . I fh u s b a n da n dw i f e
are present, the husband is by deﬁnition head of household.
age/10 age head of household in tens of years.
Education level head of household
reference category: primary education only.
d_edu2 1 if lower vocational training; 0 otherwise.
d_edu3 1 if intermediate vocational training or highschool; 0 otherwise.
d_edu4 1 if higher vocational training; 0 otherwise.
d_edu5 1 if university degree; 0 otherwise.
Labour market status head of household
Reference category: employee.
d_unem 1 if unemployed; 0 otherwise.
d_ret 1 if retired; 0 otherwise.
d_dis 1 if disabled; 0 otherwise.
d_two 1 two-earner household; 0 otherwise.35
Table A2. Estimates of initial condition equations in unrestricted model
Realization (y) Prediction (p)
variable estimate t-value variable estimate t-value
constant0 1.97 10.08 constant0 0.78 3.22
gender0 -0.13 -2.43 gender0 -0.090 -2.25
age/100 -0.59 -7.06 age/100 -0.26 -2.93
(age/10)2
0 0.043 4.33 (age/10)2
0 0.019 2.16
d_edu20 0.078 1.24 d_edu20 0.0090 0.17
d_edu30 0.24 4.21 d_edu30 0.040 0.77
d_edu40 0.39 5.78 d_edu40 0.12 1.76
d_edu50 0.48 5.03 d_edu50 0.17 1.94
d_unem0 -0.48 -5.28 d_unem0 -0.21 -2.86
d_ret0 0.053 0.52 d_ret0 -0.069 -0.90
d_dis0 -0.84 -10.31 d_dis0 -0.33 -3.63
d_two0 -0.10 -2.38 d_two0 -0.067 -2.04
θ0 0.44 4.62
σ²,0 1.41 85.82 σω,0 1.03 27.46
σ²1,²0 -0.40 -6.97 σω1,ω0 -0.10 -1.87






Table A3. Estimates restricted model (restrictions: β1 = γ1,θ1 = ρ,θ2 =0 )
Realization (y) Prediction (p)
variable estimate t-value variable estimate t-value
constant0 1.94 9.98 constant0 0.90 3.52
gender0 -0.13 -2.51 gender0 -0.097 -2.37
age/100 -0.58 -6.96 age/100 -0.28 -3.07
(age/10)2
0 0.042 4.24 (age/10)2
0 0.020 2.22
d_edu20 0.076 1.22 d_edu20 0.018 0.33
d_edu30 0.24 4.25 d_edu30 0.039 0.71
d_edu40 0.40 6.00 d_edu40 0.11 1.60
d_edu50 0.50 5.25 d_edu50 0.16 1.78
d_unem0 -0.48 -5.22 d_unem0 -0.24 -3.22
d_ret0 0.048 0.47 d_ret0 -0.056 -0.71
d_dis0 -0.83 -10.15 d_dis0 -0.37 -3.85












ρ 0.45 20.52 θ0 0.45 4.44
λ1986 1.33 16.48 ν1986 0.94 9.47
λ1987 1.21 14.62 ν1987 0.99 9.93
λ1988 1.17 14.33 ν1988 1.05 10.47
λ1989 1.43 17.28 ν1989 1.02 9.82
λ1990 1.68 19.78 ν1990 0.94 8.74
λ1991 1.24 14.55 ν1991 1.12 10.41
λ1992 1.23 14.59 ν1992 1.13 10.69
λ1993 1.26 15.17 ν1993 0.94 9.42
λ1994 1.05 12.94
continued on next page37
Table A3, continued
variable estimate t-value variable estimate t-value
m
y















4 2.62 142.43 m
p
4 2.73 21.11
σ²,0 1.41 86.12 σω,0 1.06 20.59
σ² 1.33 110.58 σω 0.99 32.60
σαy 0.056 1.14 σαp 0.25 11.56
σ²1,²0 -0.43 -8.58 σω1,ω0 -0.0067 -0.41
σ²t,²0 0.053 4.01 σωt,ω0 0.030 2.36










log likelihood: -59429 (number of observations = 6408)